Collective intelligence refers to the ability of groups to outperform individuals in solving cognitive tasks. Although numerous studies have demonstrated this effect, the mechanisms underlying collective intelligence remain poorly understood. Here, we investigate diversity in cue beliefs as a mechanism potentially promoting collective intelligence. In our experimental study, human groups observed a sequence of cartoon characters, and classified each character as a cooperator or defector based on informative and uninformative cues. Participants first made an individual decision. They then received social information consisting of their group members' decisions before making a second decision. Additionally, individuals reported their beliefs about the cues. Our results showed that individuals made better decisions after observing the decisions of others. Interestingly, individuals developed different cue beliefs, including many wrong ones, despite receiving identical information. Diversity in cue beliefs, however, did not predict collective improvement. Using simulations, we found that diverse collectives did provide better social information, but that individuals failed to reap those benefits because they relied too much on personal information. Our results highlight the potential of belief diversity for promoting collective intelligence, but suggest that this potential often remains unexploited because of over-reliance on personal information.
Introduction
Decision makers are constantly confronted with uncertainty about the true state of the world (e.g. is this skin lesion malignant, is this person telling the truth) [1, 2] . To improve decision accuracy, individuals need to obtain relevant information, often in the form of environmental cues (e.g. the shape, colour and symmetry of a skin lesion). Next to personal sampling, another powerful approach for reducing uncertainty is to use information provided by others, so-called social information [3 -8] . By pooling the capacities of multiple individuals (either by combining independent judgements, or direct interaction mechanisms), groups of decision makers can reduce uncertainty-an effect known as collective intelligence, swarm intelligence or collective cognition [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . In a variety of domains including predator detection [18 -21] , medical decision-making [1, 22, 23] , geopolitical forecasting [24] , prediction markets [25] and lie detection [26] , it has been shown that groups can outperform the average individual and sometimes even the best individual. Understanding the conditions increasing (or decreasing) the performance of collectives is thus of key importance for several applied contexts. For example, in diagnostic decision-making, it is important to understand how to compose groups of doctors [1, 22, 23] , and how to combine doctors with machine learning algorithms [27] to achieve collective intelligence.
The extent to which combining individual information allows collectives to outperform individuals is crucially mediated by the level of independence as highlighted by several theoretical studies [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] . In these studies, independence is usually treated as a statistical concept, meaning that the likelihood of an individual being correct does not change depending on whether other members are correct [33] . Decisions of group members can be negatively correlated, which generally is thought to enhance the group's potential to achieve collective intelligence [28, 32] , uncorrelated, or positively correlated, which is thought to be detrimental for collective intelligence. Despite the importance of the nature of such correlations for collective intelligence, knowledge of the mechanisms determining the level of independenceand the subsequent scope for collective intelligence-in the real world are largely lacking.
Many decision-making environments involve multiple cues that can be either informative or uninformative about the true state of the world [34] [35] [36] . For example, a jury member judging whether a defendant is guilty can use multiple cues including the defendant's testimony, previous interactions with the criminal justice system, witness statements and other cues. Such decisions involving multiple cues can be challenging for individuals because the validities of the cues are often only partly known. In such situations, we may expect the benefits of collective intelligence to depend on individual differences in cue beliefs. If all group members have similar beliefs about the cues present (e.g. by specializing on the same cues), they are likely to arrive at similar individual decisions, leaving little scope for collective intelligence. However, if individuals have different beliefs about the cues present (e.g. by specializing on different cues), combining their decisions is expected to improve collective accuracy. Former theoretical studies indeed identified variation in weights assigned to cues as an important source of independence [37, 38] . Given that many decision-making contexts require the integration of multiple cues, diversity in cue beliefs is thus a potentially widespread mechanism underlying collective intelligence, but few experimental studies have investigated this. Sorkin et al. [39] showed that providing group members with more similar information reduced group performance, through an increased positive correlation among members' judgements [39] . The provisioning of information in this experiment, however, was highly controlled, providing each group member with unique information. This leaves unresolved the questions if and how individuals in groups naturally diverge in cue beliefs when confronted with the same information (e.g. the same hearing in court), which is the focus of the current study.
To address how diversity in cue beliefs affects collective intelligence, we performed an experiment in which individuals in groups were confronted with a binary classification task containing multiple cues, the meaning of which was learned through feedback. Cues could be either informative or uninformative. Participants first made an individual decision. They then received social information consisting of the decisions of the other group members before making a second decision. In addition to their decisions, we quantified participants' cue beliefs to determine how differences in cue beliefs affected collective intelligence. For the reasons given above, we predicted that individuals in high-diversity groups would show a higher collective improvement than individuals in low-diversity groups. This result was expected for both informative cues (which would allow the collective to capitalize on different relevant information) and uninformative cues (in which case, different wrong beliefs can cancel each other out at the collective level).
Material and methods

Experimental procedures
Participants were 293 students from the University of Bielefeld, split into 14 groups (mean group size: 21, range: 17 -24). We obtained informed consent from each participant prior to the experiment. Each group completed a sequence of binary classification tasks, in which they decided whether a cartoon character projected on a white screen was a cooperator or defector (figure 1b). The cues were various items worn by the character (beard, belt, briefcase, hat, shoes, glasses, tie and umbrella). In total, there were eight items: four uninformative (i.e. equally present for both cooperators and defectors) and four informative (i.e. more often present for cooperators than defectors, or vice versa). Of the four informative cues, two were more indicative of a cooperator (cooperator cue) and two of a defector (defector cue). There were 40 rounds in total and in each round the character was wearing four cues. All eight cues were shown equally often (i.e. 20 times). The weights of each of the informative cues were the same, meaning that, for example, a character wearing two cooperator cues and one defector cue was deemed a cooperator. Each character had a dominant majority of informative cues; thus, a participant with full knowledge of the cue meanings and weights would be able to classify all cases correctly.
After observing a character, each participant had 5 s to make an individual decision ( poll 1) using a wireless electronic keypad (Key Point Interactive Audience Software for Power Point, version: 2.0.142 Standard Edition). After poll 1, individuals were shown social information-specifically, the number of group members voting cooperator/defector. They then made a second decision on the same character (without seeing it again) ( poll 2). After poll 2, the number of group members voting cooperator/defector in poll 2 was shown along with the correct answer. This procedure was repeated 40 times, providing participants with the opportunity to learn the cue validities. Participants were instructed to maximize the accuracy of both their decisions (i.e. poll 1 & poll 2). Occasionally, participants missed the opportunity to respond. These missing values were excluded from all analyses ( 2.4%). By filling out a survey after each 10 rounds, participants reported their beliefs about each cue on a seven-point confidence scale ranging from 23 (very confident that the cue is indicative of a defector), to 0 (uninformative cue) to þ3 (very confident that the cue is indicative of a cooperator). We ran four versions of the experiment, counterbalancing the meaning of the cues across the four versions. Specifically, each cue was used once as a cooperator cue, once as a defector cue and twice as an uninformative cue. Each group experienced only one of the four versions (i.e. cue validity was stable across the experiment within each group).
Accuracy of decisions and beliefs
To analyse whether participants learned to discriminate between cooperators and defectors over time, we used a generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) [40] with 'individual decision correct' (yes/no) as a response variable and round as a fixed effect. Next, we compared the accuracy of individual decisions (i.e. 'poll 1') to that of decisions with social information (i.e. 'poll 2') and to the accuracy of a majority rule. For the majority rule, we determined for each round (within each group) whether there was a majority of individual votes for cooperator or defector. The majority rule took the option receiving most support as the final decision, and ties were broken randomly. The majority rule acts as a hypothetical benchmark, illustrating how much individuals could have improved if they had always followed the majority. We used a GLMM with 'decision correct' (yes/no) as a response variable and round in interaction with response type ( poll 1, poll 2 and majority rule) as a fixed effect. For both GLMMs, we assumed that the decision accuracy at round 1 was 50% and therefore removed the intercept term. We included individual nested in group and experiment version (1-4) as random effects in both GLMMs, and used binomial errors and a probit-link function. Significance values were derived from the corresponding z-values and associated pvalues, using the lme4 package in R [41] .
To test whether participants became better at correctly classifying the cues, we used a GLMM (with probit-link function) with 'cue correctly classified' (yes/no) as a response variable, survey (1-4) as a fixed effect, and individual nested in group and experiment version (1 -4) as random effects. We ran separate models for cooperator, defector and uninformative cues.
We used the weighted additive model (WADD) to verify that the reported cue beliefs correctly predicted the participants' responses [42] . WADD assumes that an individual sums the weights in favour of cooperator versus defector and chooses the option with the highest sum-score. Thereby, individuals are assumed to weigh their cues according to their reported subjective validity of the cue (i.e. the confidence in their cue beliefs). Each cue received a weight ranging from -3 (i.e. very confident that the cue indicates a defector) via 0 (i.e. uninformative cue) to þ 3 (i.e. very confident that the cue indicates a cooperator). Hence, a negative sum-score indicates that the participant has a net belief that the character is a defector, whereas a positive value indicates a net belief that the character is a cooperator. The higher the score, the stronger the belief. We tested whether these beliefs predicted participants' choices using a GLMM with 'decision' (cooperator/defector) as a response variable, 'sum-score' as a fixed effect, and individual nested in group and experiment version as random effects. Furthermore, we compared WADD with two other prominent decision strategies, namely the take-the-best (TTB) and the equal-weight (EQW) strategy, using a maximum-likelihood approach following Pachur & Marinello [43] . Accordingly, we calculated for each strategy a G 2 -value as a measure of the goodness of fit. The lower the G 2 -value, the better the model fit. When applying TTB, individuals only rely on the subjectively most valid cue, whereas individuals using EQW count the cues in favour of each option (neglecting the weights) and take the option with the most cues favouring this option. If a strategy failed to make a prediction, we assumed a 50% probability of predicting cooperator or defector. Because cue validities were learned over time, this analysis considered only the cue beliefs reported after round 30 and decisions made from round 26 to 35.
Diversity
To analyse the effect of diversity in cue beliefs on collective improvement after observing social information, we calculated the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for each group [44] as a measure of similarity in cue beliefs. We calculated the ICC separately for (i) informative and (ii) uninformative cues using the 'irr' package in R [45] . (i) For the informative cues, we treated the reported confidence scores as interval data ranging from -3 (high confidence in the wrong interpretation) via 0 (no cue usage) to þ3 (high confidence in the correct interpretation). (ii) For uninformative cues, there is no correct interpretation (apart from not using them). A strong belief in an uninformative cue can drive the decision maker into making the correct decision if the belief coincides with the actual 'state of the world' (i.e. cooperator or defector) or, equally often, into making the wrong decision if the belief does not coincide with the 'state of the world'. Consequently, a strong belief in an uninformative cue is acting like a strong belief in two informative cues, with one being correct and one being wrong. Therefore, we treated each uninformative cue like two separate cues, each reflecting one of the two possible states (i.e. correct/wrong belief ). More formally, we duplicated each cue and treated one duplicate as if the belief that the cue indicates a cooperator is correct and its counterpart as if this belief is wrong. The ICC ranges from negative (individuals with diverse beliefs), via 0, to positive (individuals with similar beliefs). Because cue validities needed to be learned over time, we limited all analyses on cue beliefs to decisions made in rounds 26 to 35 and to cue beliefs reported after round 30.
We used a linear mixed model to test the effect of collective cue diversity on improvement in individuals' decision accuracy after observing the social information. We used the absolute increase in decision accuracy at poll 2 as a response variable, including the similarity measures, average individual performance and group size as fixed effects. Significance values were derived from the corresponding t values, using the lme4 package in R [41] .
Model simulations
The extent to which individuals in groups exploit any potential benefits of collective diversity is expected to depend on (i) group size and (ii) their willingness to incorporate social information. We used model simulations to investigate these relationships further. From our data, we randomly sampled groups of n (3, 7, 11 and 19) individuals exposed to the same version of the experiment, determined the diversity in their informative and uninformative cue beliefs (focusing again on rounds 26 to 35), and studied their collective improvement at different sensitivities to social information. To this end, we varied the voting quota [29] , defined as the minimal proportion of individuals with an opposing decision needed to trigger a change in decision. If the voting quota is not reached, a voter will keep its initial decision. We varied the voting quota from 50% (i.e. majority rule) to 80%, with 10% increments. The higher the voting quota, the less sensitive individuals are to rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org J. R. Soc. Interface 15: 20180155 social information. For each simulation run, we calculated a group's collective improvement as the difference between the collective performance and the average performance of individual group members. Importantly, these simulations were based on participants' actual cue beliefs and decisions in poll 1. We ran 1 000 000 simulation repetitions for each combination of group size and voting quota.
Empirical switching thresholds
Because we expected the effects of diversity on collective improvement to depend on the individual's willingness to incorporate social information (see results of model simulations below), we first investigated how individuals weighed personal and social information by studying their empirical switching thresholds over the course of the experiment. Specifically, we studied the likelihood that individuals changed their decision at poll 2 as a function of the proportion of group members making an opposing decision. We used GLMMs with 'decision switched' from poll 1 to poll 2 (yes/no) as a response variable and included the 'proportion of group members making the opposing decision from the focal individual' as a fixed effect. This fixed effect was included alone, in interaction with round, and in interaction with the past performance of the focal individual. We ran two separate GLMMs. In the first analysis, both round and performance were treated as dichotomous variables. For rounds, we compared the first with the second half of the experiment. For past performance, we compared individuals whose past performance was above the group average with individuals whose past performance was below the group average. In the second analysis, both round and past performance were included as continuous variables (with past performance for each individual being calculated as their average individual decision accuracy in all preceding rounds). From the model estimations, we determined the 'switching threshold', defined as the proportion of group members with an opposing decision required to induce a 50% likelihood of the focal individual switching his decision. The higher this threshold, the less sensitive individuals were to social information. Note that voting quota and switching thresholds are related in the sense that both parameters describe the sensitivity to social information. However, the first describes a strict decision rule, while the second describes probabilistic behaviour. In both models, individual nested in group and experiment version were fitted as random effects and a probit-link function was used. In the second analysis, we additionally used the BOBYQA optimizer from the lme4 package in R because the default optimizer failed to converge. figure 2c) . At each survey, participants identified only approximately 1/ 3 of the uninformative cues correctly; 1/3 were erroneously classified as cooperator cues and 1/3 as defector cues, indicating that participants incorporated many false beliefs. Individuals tended to classify certain uninformative cues more often as cooperator or defector. Glasses and beard, for example, were more often associated with a defector; tie and umbrella, in contrast, more often with a cooperator (electronic supplementary material, figure S1 ).
Results
Accuracy of decisions and beliefs
Cue beliefs, in turn, were good predictors of participants' decisions: the more strongly an individual believed that the cues present in a round were indicative of a cooperator/ defector, the more likely they were to choose cooperator/ defector (est + s.e. ¼ 0.248 + 0.011; z ¼ 20.65; p , 0.001; electronic supplementary material, figure S2 ). In addition, the decisions were best described by WADD (G Figure 4 shows how group size and voting quota impacted the extent to which individuals benefited from diversity in cue beliefs. For both informative and uninformative cues, the effect of diversity on collective improvement depended on the voting quota. When individuals had a low voting quota of 50% (i.e. changed their decision as soon as they were in the minority), more diverse groups were able to improve more than less diverse groups. Likewise, larger groups were able to improve more than smaller groups. However, when the voting quota was increased, making individuals less sensitive to social information, three different effects emerged: (i) overall collective improvement decreased, (ii) the relative benefit of large groups decreased and (iii) the effect of diversity on collective improvement was substantially weakened. Importantly, these effects occurred for both informative and uninformative cues, despite uninformative cues being irrelevant for discriminating between cooperators and defectors. Electronic supplementary material, figure S6 shows how the importance of diversity interacted with average individual performance of group members. In short, the mediating role of diversity on collective improvement was highest when the average individual accuracy was between 60% and 90%.
Model simulations
Empirical switching thresholds
The likelihood of individuals to change their decision between poll 1 and poll 2 increased in a sigmoidal manner with an increasing 'proportion of opposing decisions' ( figure 5a,b) . There was a significant interaction effect of rounds and 'proportion of opposing decisions' on switching threshold (est + s.e. ¼ 0.351 + 0.073; z ¼ 4.78; p , 0.001; figure 5a,b): participants used lower switching thresholds in the second than in the first half of the experiment, indicating that individuals became more sensitive to social information.
There was also a significant interaction effect of individuals' past performance and 'proportion of opposing decisions' on the switching threshold (est + s.e. ¼ 0.381 + 0.088; z ¼ 4.33; p , 0.001; figure 5a,b): relatively poor performers used lower switching thresholds and were thus more sensitive to social information than relatively good performers. Figure 5c shows the model predictions when both rounds and individuals' past performance were treated as continuous variables, confirming that individuals lowered their switching thresholds over time (est + s.e. ¼ 0.039 + 0.006; z ¼ 6.43; p , 0.001), and that low-performing individuals used lower switching thresholds (est + s.e. ¼ 21.454 + 0.415; z ¼ 23.5; p , 0.001). Importantly, the estimated empirical switching threshold over the entire experiment was between 75% and 90%, indicating that a large majority with an opposing decision was needed before individuals changed their mind, and illustrating the relative reluctance to incorporate social information.
Discussion
Our results show that individuals experiencing the same environment can develop different beliefs about the cue validities. Given that individuals in many real-world situations do not experience the same environment, but are exposed to ( partly) different sources of information, this 'diversification' of cue beliefs is likely to be even more pronounced in more realistic decision-making tasks. Although individuals generally profited from the decisions of others and diversity in cue beliefs directly affected the correlation among votes (electronic supplementary material, figure S5 ), the level of diversity did not predict the collective improvement in accuracy. Our model simulations provide a clue as to why this effect was absent: the mediating role of diversity on collective improvement depended on how sensitive individuals were to social information, with diversity being important when individuals used relatively low switching thresholds. However, rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org J. R. Soc. Interface 15: 20180155 this effect disappeared when individuals became less sensitive to social information and required a larger majority before switching their initial decision. Interestingly, these effects applied to diversity in beliefs about informative and uninformative cues alike (figure 4). Inspection of the empirical switching thresholds employed in the experiment revealed that individuals used relatively high switching thresholds. Although the switching threshold declined over the course of the experiment (showing that individuals became more willing to respond to social information), it remained, on average, above 75% even in the second half of the experiment (figure 5b). Individuals using such high thresholds are predicted to benefit only weakly, if at all, from diversity in cue beliefs. Although diversity is generally considered to be crucial in fostering collective intelligence [28 -31,39,46] , the general reluctance to using social information (see also below) might reduce its importance in natural decision environments. Interestingly, methods that algorithmically combine the decisions of different decision makers [22, 23] will not suffer the same consequences, as the optimal thresholds can simply be set by an external decision maker.
Although individuals did not capitalize on the potential benefits of diversity, they did develop different beliefs while experiencing identical environments. The exact mechanisms underlying this diversity in our experiment are not yet clear. Individuals may have decided to focus on different cues and, as a result, generated different hypotheses and beliefs about them. Research on group memory has shown that group members making the same observation store different information, making the information only partly redundant [47] . More mechanistic approaches, such as eyetracking, could provide more insights into the development of (and individual differences in) cue beliefs [48] . Furthermore, a better understanding of how differences in cue sequences generate differences in beliefs could shed light on how individuals navigate such environments, and how different training regimes could be implemented to foster diversity between decision makers. Future studies could also investigate the importance of diversity in cue beliefs in interacting groups. For example, do individuals in interactive groups naturally specialize in different cues, thereby reaping increased collective benefits? Future work could also investigate and test our predictions in real-world decision-making contexts-for example, medical diagnostics [1] , lie detection [26] or any context in which multiple cues need to be integrated to make a final decision.
Our model simulations suggest that diversity in uninformative cues can also be important for collective improvements. Intriguingly, individuals did not become better at correctly interpreting uninformative cues over time. Although each uninformative cue appeared equally often with a cooperator and defector, two-thirds of individuals considered them to be indicative of either a cooperator or a defector at any time in the experiment. Previous research has shown that individuals frequently observe patterns in random sequences of events [49 -51] . Participants also showed propensities to associate certain uninformative items more often with cooperator or defector (electronic supplementary material, figure S1 ), which could increase the Our simulations show that whether or not such false beliefs impair collective performance depends on whether individuals develop similar false beliefs, in which case collective improvements are hampered, or different false beliefs, which can be cancelled out at the collective level.
The simulation results further suggest that any positive effect of diversity on collective performance will depend on the average individual performance of a group: only when the average individual accuracy fell between approximately 60% and 90%, was there a positive effect of diversity on collective performance (electronic supplementary material, figure S6 ). When the average individual performance exceeded 90%, there was little room for collective improvement; when it fell below 60%, there was probably insufficient reliable information for groups to improve. Most groups in our experiment fell within this beneficial range; the same is likely to apply in most real-world decision-making contexts. Moreover, we found a positive effect of combining diverse decisions only when the average individual performance was above 50%. This classical finding is consistent with Condorcet's jury theorem, which predicts that the accuracy of a majority vote increases with group size but only if the average individual accuracy is above 50% [52 -54] . Increasing group size is predicted to worsen collective performance if the average individual accuracy is below 50%. Diversity is predicted to determine the strength of both effects: above 50% individual accuracy, the higher the diversity, the stronger the collective gains; below 50% individual accuracy, the higher the diversity, the stronger the collective losses [55] .
One of the remaining questions is why individuals were relatively reluctant to incorporate social information and instead used suboptimal switching thresholds. For example, rsif.royalsocietypublishing.org J. R. Soc. Interface 15: 20180155 applying a simple majority rule to the group members' first decisions resulted in decisions that were substantially better than participants' second decisions. Such suboptimal use of social information has been repeatedly reported [56 -60] and various reasons for it have been suggested. One is that decision makers often mistrust others' opinions, a phenomenon called 'egocentric discounting' [61] . Another is that people underestimate the effectiveness of combining decisions [62] . Yet overvaluing personal information can be adaptive in some environments. In highly fluctuating environments, for example, social information can quickly become outdated, making personal information more reliable [63, 64] . Moreover, over-reliance on social information can initiate false informational cascades [15, 65] . Despite suboptimal use of social information, we found some hints of context-dependent threshold adjustments. First, individuals generally lowered their thresholds over time, suggesting that they first need to learn the validity of the social signal. This validity could be learned because correct feedback was provided after each round. Second, individuals adjusted their switching thresholds to their own performance: high performers used relatively high switching thresholds, whereas low performers used lower switching thresholds. This result corroborates the general finding that individuals with poorer personal information rely more on social information (copy when uncertain) [5, 8, [66] [67] [68] . Previous research has also shown that individuals adjust their switching thresholds to the quality of social information (i.e. the group performance) [69] . Most probably, individuals in groups monitor their own performance and the group performance and incorporate both when deciding how to respond to social information. In our study, individuals were provided with aggregated social information of the whole group (global information). Future work could further investigate how different social network structures and non-anonymous information lead to information use of ( preferred) group members.
To conclude, our findings show that individuals developed different beliefs about cues despite observing the same information. Such diversity in beliefs about both informative and uninformative cues has the potential to promote collective intelligence. Individuals, however, did not benefit from this diversity because they over-relied on personal information. Because undervaluing social information is a widely observed phenomenon, we postulate that the potential collective benefits of diversity may frequently remain unexploited.
Data accessibility. Data are included as electronic supplementary material.
